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Introduction 
What do Channel 4, 
Companies House, the Post 
Office, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, the Royal Mint and 
URENCO (a nuclear fuel 
company), have in common? 
All of them have their 
financial relationships with 
the British government 
managed by an agency, UK 
Government Investments 
(UKGI). All of these 
organisations finance their 
activities through charges 
made to various categories 
of user; all of them are 
subject to strong state 
engagement because all are 
perceived as serving a wider 
public purpose. 
This diverse list of 
organisations may be 
described as hybrids – 
neither branches of 
government, nor commercial 
organisations, but with some 
of the characteristics of each. 
The term ‘UK Government 
Investments’ is misleading 
because the government 
financial involvement in 
these activities is not 
substantially based on an 
investment motive and any 
change to that involvement 
would rightly be the subject 
of public interest and 
scrutiny.  
There are also many hybrid 
organisations outside the 
remit of UKGI: the BBC; 
museums and galleries; the 
Royal Parks; NHS hospital 
trusts; Heathrow Airport; the 
Bank of England; 
universities; the Corporation 
of London; privatised water 
and rail companies; newly 
created academies in 
secondary education; etc. 
That is before noting the 
many private businesses 
which derive much of their 
revenue from public sector 
activities: care home 
providers; companies with 
extensive outsourcing 
businesses; defence 
contractors. Then there is a 
wide range of public 
buildings and infrastructure 
assets are owned through 
special purpose vehicles; for 
example, the iconic Treasury 
building is leased to and from 
a private company which 
undertook and financed an 
extensive refurbishment. 
For each hybrid, a related 
group of issues arises. What 
is the governance structure, 
and how does it reflect the 
wider public interest in these 
businesses? What is the 
capital structure, and in 
particular how is the equity 
obtained? What is the 
administrative procedure 
which takes control of these 
organisations if they fail, 
either financially or in terms 
of their wider societal 
objectives? It is evident 
simply from posing these 
questions that there are no 
common answers to them. 
Indeed in several cases it is 
not at all clear what the 
answers to these questions 
are. Even within UKGI, there 
appears to be little read 
across on these matters 
between organisations - no 
systematic analysis of what 
works well and what does 
not. This paper is a 
preliminary attempt to raise 
these issues. Such hybrids 
account for at least one 
quarter of all economic 
activity in the UK, and, given 
the structure of the Welsh 
economy, it is likely that this 
proportion is even higher in 
Wales. 
Why hybrids? 
A century ago, Max Weber 
famously identified the 
defining characteristic of the 
state as the monopoly of 
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legitimate coercion within a 
territory (Weber (2015) pp. 
135-6). In the 19th century, 
the principal functions of the 
state were essentially 
coercive. Although the 
modern state continues to 
exercise these functions, it is 
primarily engaged in the 
delivery of services. We look 
to it to provide health and 
education, and these are the 
principal items in the budgets 
of most such states. 
Government provides 
transport infrastructure, and 
collects the rubbish; it 
ensures that taps flow with 
water and that electricity 
sockets are live. There is 
even an expectation that the 
state, or its agencies, provide 
entertainment on television 
and ensure fast internet 
connections. 
The principal criterion for 
assessing performance in 
coercive activity is the 
legitimacy of the process. 
Judges and police officers 
are expected to adhere to the 
dictates of the law: if 
someone goes to prison it 
should be because they have 
committed a specified 
offence, not because they 
are thought to be a bad 
person. Likewise tax 
inspectors and benefit clerks 
are expected to collect and 
disburse according to the 
rules, not by reference to 
what they think is fair. 
However when the state 
delivers services, the 
principal concern is with the 
quality of the services. For 
example, we are not 
interested in how rubbish is 
collected: we just want it 
taken away. A good school is 
one which provides a good 
education for our children. 
We want comfortable and 
reliable trains, and the 
question of who provides the 
train is relevant only to the 
extent that it bears on these 
outcomes.  
If the service can be provided 
in a competitive market, exit 
is generally a more effective 
mechanism of control than 
voice. If we do not like what a 
supermarket provides, we 
patronise another 
supermarket next time. This 
exercise of choice is 
generally a more powerful 
spur to innovation and 
improvement than complaint. 
Eastern European 
supermarkets were glum 
places, and Britain’s once 
proud cooperative grocery 
stores went into decline 
under the supervision of 
people whose primary 
concerns were ideological 
rather than in ensuring that 
the shelves were stocked 
with the things its customers 
wanted to buy (Myners, 
2014). Nationalised 
industries suffered, and 
schools and hospitals still do, 
from the infiltration of 
producer interest groups into 
the supposed mechanisms of 
democratic control. 
For many services, such as 
water supply or commuter 
trains, there is no competitive 
market, or plausible 
likelihood of one. For other 
public services, such as the 
Land Registry and 
universities, the public 
interest in, and value of, their 
activities extends well 
beyond the revenues they 
earn. In addition there are 
businesses, such as Royal 
Bank of Scotland and 
Carillion, which did provide 
services in a competitive 
market, but whose failure to 
do so successfully raised 
issues of public interest 
which government could not 
ignore. That is why we have, 
and will continue to have, 
many hybrids, and why the 
attempt to draw clear 
boundaries between public 
and private sector will 
necessarily fail.  
 
Forms of commercial 
organisation 
Any trading organisation -
one which has multiple 
sources of revenue and 
expenditure,   requires 
access to reserves, to allow 
medium to long-term 
planning of its activities, 
which will inevitably imply 
uneven cash flows, and to 
provide for the unexpected, 
both losses and 
opportunities. The general 
answer to this problem in the 
private sector has been 
shareholder-provided equity. 
Payments to equity investors 
can be varied from year to 
year, depending on the 
profitability and cash flow 
requirements of the 
business, and by virtue of 
their contribution 
shareholders hold a residual 
claim on the assets of the 
business in any voluntary or 
involuntary liquidation. 
In return, shareholders enjoy 
a primary role in governance. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 48 
This is the reality in smaller 
companies. In larger ones, 
whose share ownership is 
inevitably dispersed, 
shareholder accountability is 
largely theoretical, although it 
has regained strength from 
the innovation of the hostile 
takeover and the ideological 
promotion of shareholder 
value which went with the 
financialisation of the British 
and American economies. 
Throughout the 20th century, 
the private corporation had 
been the dominant 
mechanism of economic 
organisation. By the 1980s, 
that dominance had become 
so overwhelming that any 
other form of organisation 
was perceived as archaic. 
Many mutuals and 
partnerships converted to 
limited companies, and many 
state-owned functions were 
restructured as corporate 
entities, generally though not 
always through privatisation. 
It was not irrelevant that 
these processes enabled 
value to be realised 
immediately for the benefit of 
those initiating or approving 
such change. This was to the 
substantial benefit of the 
members of mutuals, the 
current leaders of 
partnerships, and 
governments which 
controlled state enterprises. 
Today the argument in favour 
of the public limited company 
looks more nuanced. The 
conviction that the promotion 
of shareholder value was the 
best route to economic 
efficiency has waned. Issues 
of corporate governance, 
and of self-serving behaviour 
by executives, have caused 
increasing concern. Beyond 
the global financial crisis, 
some egregious individual 
cases have highlighted a 
diverse range of problems: 
governance and 
management concerns at 
Sports Direct; financial 
mismanagement at BHS; the 
collapse of Carillion. 
Accountability mechanisms 
in the private limited 
company sector are not 
necessarily self-regulating, 
and they may fail to take 
sufficient account of 
legitimate public interest 
concerns. 
The duties of directors of a 
British company are defined 
by the 2006 Companies Act, 
and in particular by section 
172 of that Act, which states: 
Duty to promote the success of 
the company 
(1) A director of a company must act 
in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in doing 
so have regard (amongst other 
matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any 
decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company's 
employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company's 
business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company's 
operations on the community and 
the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between 
members of the company. 
This formulation is 
intentionally ambiguous. It 
cannot be interpreted as ‘the 
purpose of the companies to 
maximise profits’: the duty of 
the board of a company is to 
promote the success of the 
company, not the interests of 
its shareholders. However, 
the statute acknowledges 
that since the shareholders 
are residual claimants on the 
revenues and assets of the 
company it is likely that 
promoting the success of the 
company will benefit the 
members. Thus section 172 
appears to give shareholders 
priority, while requiring the 
board to have regard to the 
interests of the stakeholder 
groups – employees, 
suppliers, customers and the 
community – and to sustain 
the corporate reputation. 
Legislation in 2004 
introduced the concept of the 
community interest 
company: organisations 
which are not run for profit, 
but which are not charitable 
(Companies (Audit, 
Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) Act 
2004, Pt 2). The essential 
difference between a 
community interest company 
and an ordinary limited 
company is the asset lock: a 
prohibition on distributing the 
assets of the company for 
anything but community 
purposes. There is a 
specifically established 
regulator of community 
interest companies. None of 
the hybrids described in this 
paper are registered as 
community interest 
companies, although it 
seems a natural description 
of many of them. Adoption of 
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this organisational form has 
been entirely by private 
sector agents such as local 
sports clubs. 
The majority of US states 
have now passed legislation 
recognising ‘B corporations’: 
for-profit entities which 
nevertheless proclaim a 
commitment to public good. 
The B corporation movement 
is evangelical, and some 
companies in the UK and 
elsewhere have subscribed 
to it. Such a declaration is 
broadly consistent with the 
general terms of section 172, 
although advocates of such 
corporations seek explicit 
amendment to legislation 
(see, for example, 
bcorporation.uk). 
However all these forms 
leave a number of 
governance questions 
unanswered, and the recent 
near-collapse of the British 
cooperative movement, 
growing reservations about 
the consequences of water 
privatisation and rail 
franchising, and the 
increasingly precarious 
financial position of NHS 
trusts, illustrates that 
dissatisfaction with 
governance mechanisms in 
the hybrid sector is rife. 
The finances of hybrids 
Some hybrids are private 
companies with 
shareholders. The Royal 
Bank of Scotland and 
URENCO have external 
shareholders. The Royal 
Mint, Ordnance Survey and 
Network Rail are also 
incorporated as limited 
companies but their only 
shareholder is the Secretary 
of State. All of these apply 
the formal structures of other 
private companies, with a 
board of directors, audit and 
remuneration committees 
and an annual report filed at 
Companies House. 
Companies House itself, like 
the Land Registry and the 
Met Office, is a trading fund, 
established under the 
Trading Funds Act 1973. 
Trading funds have no 
shareholders but otherwise 
mimic the main features of 
corporate organisation, with 
a Board of Directors, 
appointed by government, 
and a committee structure. 
Trading funds set their own 
charges for their services, 
subject to overriding political 
control, and are thus able to 
access their own limited 
reserves. Trading funds have 
no borrowing powers. 
The BBC and universities 
operate under Royal Charter. 
In the case of the BBC, the 
charter is the subject of 
regular contentious renewal, 
with associated revision not 
only of the licence fee, which 
is the main source of the 
Corporation’s revenue, but 
also of the governance 
structure and the scope of 
the Corporation’s operations. 
Universities principally derive 
income from student fees 
capped by government, with 
research funding partly 
obtained from government 
and partly through project-
specific grants obtained from 
private and other public 
sources. Most universities 
have built up some reserves 
and some have endowments 
and income from alumni 
donations. Universities can 
borrow, and have recently 
accessed bond markets on 
significant scale. 
Monopoly utilities, notably 
water and electricity supply 
businesses, are generally 
constituted as public limited 
companies, with 
shareholder-provided equity. 
Most of these companies 
attempted to diversify after 
privatisation, generally with 
unhappy results. Now only 
three of the supply 
companies created at 
privatisation, Pennon, 
Severn Trent and United 
Utilities, remain as 
autonomous quoted entities, 
with the others mostly owned 
by foreign utilities and 
investors. The latter are 
thinly capitalised, with 
minimal equity, but their debt 
is perceived as effectively 
securitised against the 
regulated asset base. Welsh 
Water has, since 2001, been 
owned by Glas Cymru, a 
company limited by 
guarantee with no 
shareholders (a unique 
structure in UK the water 
industry). The market 
position of Heathrow Airport, 
which became a subsidiary 
of the Spanish company 
Ferrovial when that company 
took over the listed BAA plc, 
is similarly strong, although 
other airports face more 
effective competition. 
Thin capitalisation is also 
characteristic of the special-
purpose vehicles through 
which private finance 
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initiatives have been 
channelled. The usual 
structure involves different 
tranches of debt, the 
subordinate tranches having 
equity characteristics - they 
are commonly traded over 
the project’s lifetime.  
Twenty years ago, all UK 
state schools were controlled 
by local authorities, with 
virtually no fiscal autonomy. 
Reforms have created more 
autonomous local authority 
schools, academies, and 
most recently free schools. 
About two thirds of 
secondary school students, 
though only one quarter of 
primary pupils, are now in 
academies and current 
government plans would 
transfer all local authority 
schools to academy status. 
Academies may borrow from 
the national loans fund 
subject to an agreed 
repayment plan from 
government-funded revenue.  
NHS trusts also operate on 
the basis of annual grants. 
They too can borrow with 
government approval. In 
practice, such borrowing 
appears mainly to have been 
used to relieve immediate 
funding pressures. Capital 
expenditure is subject to 
direct negotiation and has 
principally been undertaken 
through private finance 
initiative (PFI) schemes. 
Governance 
Herbert Morrison led the 
London County Council 
between the First and 
Second World Wars and was 
the founder of London 
Transport, the monopoly 
provider of public transport in 
London. Morrison visualised 
a single model of the hybrid, 
which was applied to the 
public corporations created 
during the Labour 
government of 1945 to 1951 
of which Morrison was a 
member. The key element in 
governance was the board. 
Its members were to be, in 
Morrison’s resounding 
phrase, ‘high custodians of 
the public interest’ rather 
than capitalist profiteers 
(Morrison (1933) p. 157). 
This idea was not new. From 
their foundation, national 
museums and galleries had 
recruited trustees – 
distinguished individuals 
willing to devote part of their 
time to a public purpose. 
These institutions still recruit 
such people. In the 19th 
century, a sense of public 
duty had persuaded 
privileged individuals to 
promote railways and water 
supply, and to found great 
civic universities in regional 
centres such as Birmingham, 
Bristol, Leeds and 
Manchester. 
But the public corporations 
established in the wave of 
post-war nationalisation were 
not in the main successful 
organisations in delivering 
public value, either in terms 
of the quality of services 
provided to the public, or the 
efficiency with which these 
services were delivered. The 
organisations were 
dominated by engineering 
culture which valued 
technical sophistication over 
customer satisfaction. 
Squeezed between the 
interference of ministers and 
the tinkering of civil servants 
on one side, and insatiable 
demands of employees and 
customers on the other, 
potential high custodians 
found opportunities for public 
service elsewhere.  
The executive management 
of hybrid institutions must be 
accountable for the financial 
performance and social 
performance. The 
Morrisonian answer was a 
single board which was 
responsible for both. This is 
not an arrangement which, 
as described above, is widely 
regarded as having proved 
successful. An alternative is 
to establish separate boards 
for the financial and public 
interest functions, a 
mechanism established for 
the BBC in 2007. Before 
then, the BBC operated 
under a Board of Governors, 
a resolutely Morrisonian 
institution. The Royal Charter 
implemented the separation 
through a BBC Trust, distinct 
from the BBC’s management 
board, although the Trust 
retained some oversight of 
finance. This arrangement 
was regarded as a failure, 
though for rather superficial 
reasons, mostly due to the 
content of some specific 
programmes and the salaries 
of presenters. Sir David 
Clementi’s report 
(Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media & Sport, 
2016) concluded that the 
arrangement had indeed 
been a failure, and 
recommended that a unitary 
board be re-established, of 
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which Clementi became the 
first chairman. The 
supervision of social 
oversight was passed to the 
regulatory agency Ofcom, 
but financial matters 
remained with the board, 
except insofar as issues of 
competition were raised by 
the BBC’s activities. 
Although the BBC is 
particularly in the public eye, 
this illustrates some of the 
many problems of 
establishing an appropriate 
governance structure for 
hybrids. 
Resolution 
Organisations fail. Hybrid 
organisations may fail in 
either their commercial 
functions or their social 
functions, and some have. In 
a number of cases, the 
uncertainties inherent in the 
process of resolution are 
such that the government 
has intervened to avert the 
process of formal 
bankruptcy: for example at 
Royal Bank of Scotland and 
the Mid Staffordshire 
Hospital NHS trust. Both of 
those failures imposed 
substantial burdens on 
taxpayers, although the costs 
of the latter are dwarfed by 
the commitments required by 
the former. The issues raised 
by the insolvency of 
Southern Cross Care Homes 
in 2011, and last year both 
the collapse of Carillion and 
of Monarch Airlines, raises 
the question of whether 
existing insolvency 
procedures are well adapted 
to the failure of businesses 
providing important public 
services.  
In water and railways, there 
are special administration 
procedures under the 
specific legislation governing 
these industries, which 
recognise the imperative 
need to keep taps flowing 
and trains running. An 
industry-specific resolution 
procedure is now in place for 
banks, including a complex 
requirement for living wills, in 
which the institution is 
required to make and file with 
its regulator a plan for asset 
disposals and financial 
reconstruction to avoid 
insolvency. The special 
administration procedure for 
the rail industry came into 
operation during the collapse 
of Railtrack, the network 
operator, but in other rail 
cases such as the Virgin East 
Coast collapse this year, 
franchises have been 
returned to the state or 
franchisees replaced. 
Before the bankruptcy of 
Enron, the water regulator 
had required that its 
subsidiary, Wessex Water, 
was ringfenced, so that the 
creditors of the American 
parent had no recourse to the 
assets of the subsidiary, and 
the company was sold as a 
going concern without any 
consequence for water 
supply. Ringfencing of retail 
banks is also due to come 
into effect next year. There 
are no provisions for special 
administration in electricity 
analogous to those in rail and 
water; Enron also owned a 
power station in Teesside 
and it appeared likely for a 
time that the facility would 
shut down, although a 
management buyout 
restored a viable financial 
structure. 
The vast majority of hybrids 
have cushions of equity 
inadequate to deal with 
financial stress, so the 
liability for losses, when there 
are any, fall largely on debt 
holders. The normal pattern 
has been that debt during a 
construction phase is wholly 
or mainly provided by 
contractors, and then sold on 
to investors when the 
completed project is 
refinanced. John Laing was 
responsible for building the 
new National Physical 
Laboratory under a PFI 
arrangement, but was also 
the main provider of debt to 
the project, and the massive 
cost overruns on the project 
crippled the parent. The 
outcome, ironically, was the 
disposal of Laing’s 
construction facilities 
business, and John Laing plc 
continues to exist as an 
investment vehicle for long-
term PFI debt. 
There are two principal cases 
of universities flirting with 
financial disaster. In 1987, 
University College, Cardiff 
was forced into a shotgun 
marriage with the University 
of Wales Institute of Science 
And Technology (UWIST). 
London Metropolitan 
University has a troubled 
recent history, having 
claimed public funds for 
students who were not there, 
and subsequently provided 
documentation to 
prospective immigrants with 
no intention of becoming 
bona fide students. Until 
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now, however, HEFCE and 
its predecessors acted as the 
final backstop to the higher 
education sector. Ostensibly, 
with the abolition of HEFCE 
there is now no government 
underwriting of these 
institutions; they are 
expected to raise their own 
revenue based on the receipt 
of student fees and their 
success in attracting 
research funding. If they are 
not successful in this, they 
can go bankrupt. Whether 
this is true in practice 
remains to be seen; the rate 
of interest at which 
universities have been able 
to access long-term funding, 
and the no more than 
marginal differences in the 
credit ratings attached to 
these institutions, suggest 
that bond markets are 
sceptical. 
As at London Metropolitan 
University, social failure and 
financial failure are often 
associated, both groups of 
problem fundamentally 
attributable to poor executive 
management. The only 
failure to date of an NHS trust 
is that of Mid Staffordshire, 
which became notorious for 
its abysmal standards of 
patient care but also 
demonstrated weak levels of 
financial control. The same 
was true of Perry Barr 
Academies Trust, the 
Birmingham schools 
association which had 
benefitted from political hype 
considerably in excess of the 
more objective results of 
Ofsted inspections. The 
failure of the trust left 
unsettled debt to the 
Education Funding Agency. 
The National Audit Office 
issued a highly critical report 
on the costs of the 
reorganisation of the Mid 
Staffordshire Trust, which 
involved the transfer is of its 
functions and facilities to 
other trusts in the area.  
Objectives 
What are we trying to 
achieve with hybrid 
structures? They originate 
because it is believed, 
correctly, that the function 
such organisations perform 
will be better achieved by the 
introduction of commercial 
disciplines of the kind 
implemented in well-
managed private sector 
organisations. Such 
disciplines are adopted 
mostly as a result of the 
process of operating in a 
competitive market which 
requires firms to adopt the 
best - in the sense of most 
conducive to effectiveness of 
output - practices of other 
firms. 
Commercial discipline should 
not be confused with ‘the 
profit motive’: this is not an 
end in itself, but sometimes a 
means to an end. What is 
meant by commercial 
discipline involves a number 
of different components, 
relevant to all kinds of 
organisation but with greater 
or lesser importance in 
particular cases. 
First, commercial discipline 
involve the planning of 
operations and investment 
over periods longer than one 
year. The annual accounting 
cycle derives from a time 
when agriculture was a 
dominant form of economic 
activity and is inappropriate 
for most businesses today. 
For  many hybrid activities, 
the relevant time horizons for 
investment and the 
development of 
organisational capabilities is 
particularly long. 
Second, commercial 
discipline involves the 
delegation to executive 
management of 
responsibility for day-to-day 
decisions and further 
delegation to subordinates. 
Along with such delegation 
goes responsibility for 
outcomes – an emphasis on 
‘what has happened?’ and 
‘has it worked?’ rather than 
‘why did you do that?’ and 
certainly not ‘why are you 
doing that?’ It is the shift from 
control of process to 
responsibility for outcomes 
which distinguishes 
appropriately hybrid 
organisation from other 
public sector functions. That 
is not say that the delegation 
of authority and outcome is 
not relevant to other public 
sector activities - the central 
and difficult management 
skill of the police chief or 
army commander is to give 
juniors authority to act 
quickly within a highly 
disciplined framework - but 
the balance of emphasis is 
different. 
Third, while both day-to-day 
and strategic management is 
the responsibility of an 
executive team, such 
development is within the 
context of an overarching 
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framework which reflects the 
variety of legitimate public 
and private interests in the 
activities of the organisation. 
For the public limited 
company, that overarching 
framework is provided by the 
board, and to some degree 
by the asset manager in 
major institutional investors. 
It is also the board which has 
responsibility for the 
appointment of executive 
management. That raises the 
question of who appoints the 
board. In the context of a 
large public limited company, 
the board is effectively self-
perpetuating; for smaller 
companies with concentrated 
shareholdings, responsibility 
for board appointment lies 
with these shareholders. 
In the case of more or less 
every hybrid described in this 
paper, the answers to the 
questions of accountability 
and responsibility are 
complex. This may reflect a 
genuine difficulty of 
assimilating a variety of 
stakeholder interests, but in 
many cases the answers are 
simply opaque and obscure. 
Fourth, whatever the 
mechanisms of responsibility 
and accountability, they 
should be robust against 
interest group capture. In the 
private sector, the mantra of 
shareholder value has often 
recently been cover for 
capture by senior executives 
as an interest group, most 
evidently seen in explosion of 
their remuneration. Before 
the global financial crisis, 
some financial companies 
were plainly run more or less 
entirely for the benefit of 
senior employees. 
Capture by a broader group 
of employees, mostly 
through the activities of trade 
unions, was a major problem 
in British nationalised 
industries. Indeed one of the 
drivers of privatisation was 
the Thatcher government’s 
attack on union power in 
these sectors. The 
refocusing of union 
organisation toward public 
sector professional workers 
has transferred the locus of 
this issue to other areas of 
hybrid activity such as 
schools and hospitals, while 
universities have always 
been employee-dominated 
organisations. While the 
interests of private-sector 
managers and low-skilled 
public-sector workers were 
primarily financial, these 
white-collar groups have 
broader concerns, with a 
particular emphasis on 
personal autonomy. 
The emphasis above on the 
commonality of issues and 
problems in the corporate 
and hybrid sectors invites the 
question ‘what are the 
differences?’ The best 
answer to that is that 
corporate organisation works 
best when the value of 
corporate output is 
reasonably well measured by 
the revenue derived from 
customers. Hybrids are 
mostly found in activities 
where revenue is not a good 
measure of the value of 
output. 
That observation prompts the 
question of whether better 
metrics could be derived for 
the hybrid sector. When 
Gavyn Davies was chairman 
of the BBC, he promoted the 
idea that the BBC should be 
judged by the ‘public value’ 
that it created (Davies 2004). 
As a statement of the 
corporation’s purpose, this 
must be correct. But the 
notion that one might derive 
a monetary measure of the 
contribution of the BBC is 
implausible. If the BBC is 
successful in its objectives, it 
challenges fake news, 
facilitates honest debate, and 
promotes democratic values 
around the world – 
achievements which are 
potentially very large, and 
wholly unquantifiable. 
Conversely, successful 
private companies also 
create public as well as 
private value. Since the ‘triple 
bottom line’ of the corporate 
social responsibility 
movement of the 1990s the 
repeated demand has been 
that businesses should 
publish a range of metrics, 
from pay ratios to carbon 
footprints. The notion that 
only what can be counted 
counts gets in the way of 
proper analysis. The concept 
of public value is as relevant 
to a limited company as to a 
hybrid organisation, and until 
we can escape the 
caricature, and too common 
reality, that public limited 
companies are collections of 
greedy self-interested 
people, there is little chance 
of creating entities that 
combine the advantages of 
commercial discipline and 
public service.  
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Assessment 
Two issues need to be dealt 
with at the outset. The first is 
that a large part of policy 
towards hybrids, indeed the 
very extent of the hybrid 
sector, is concerned with the 
structure of the government 
balance sheet. The capacity 
of global markets to absorb 
long-term sterling 
denominated debt is not 
materially affected by 
whether such paper is 
explicitly guaranteed by the 
government, backed by long-
term contracts with that 
government or its agencies, 
or secured on revenues from 
regulated monopolies such 
as water and electricity. In all 
these cases the underlying 
covenant is fundamentally 
the same: the willingness of 
UK taxpayers and 
consumers to pay. 
In reality, because UK 
government debt is well 
understood, has been 
reliably serviced for 
centuries, and is an 
extremely liquid market, it 
provides lower-cost funding 
than alternatives. The 
linkage of smaller elements 
of equity which are negligible 
in relation to the scale of such 
long-term debt creates 
opacity and illiquidity which 
adds to costs without 
compensating benefit. There 
are in many cases good 
reasons for transferring as 
far as possible to the 
contracting sector the risks 
associated with the project 
cost overruns, and also for 
medium – not long – term 
outsourcing of facilities 
management contracts. But 
these issues are separable 
from the choice of vehicles 
for government financing. 
It is almost impossible to 
envisage a situation in which 
the British government 
planned to renege on its own 
mainstream debt, but could 
be relied on to honour long-
term contracts related to 
assets and services located 
within the UK, and allow firms 
in regulated industries to 
raise charges to UK 
consumers of water, 
electricity, rail services etc. 
Indeed the slightest attention 
to current political rhetoric 
from leading opposition 
politicians demonstrates that 
these latter sources of 
revenue for debt servicing 
are considerably more 
vulnerable than the former. 
The argument is sometimes 
made that the UK 
government needs 
substantial borrowing 
headroom to enable it to 
cope with the next financial 
crisis. The answer to this is 
not to constrain, in the 
meantime, the building of 
schools and hospitals, but to 
ensure that when such a 
crisis does occur, it does not 
impose significant costs on 
UK taxpayers. The 
ringfencing of domestic 
operations of retail banks is a 
welcome step in that 
direction. 
It was easy to see the 
purpose of Enron’s off-
balance-sheet financing. It is 
difficult to see who is 
intended to be deceived by 
the complex manoeuvres 
which enable the 
government to circumvent its 
own self-imposed financing 
rules – other than perhaps 
the government itself. James 
Carville’s famous comment 
that he wished to be 
reincarnated as the bond 
market is a classic statement 
of the influence that the 
market, or perhaps beliefs 
about the market, exert on 
political decision-making 
(Carville in WSJ, 25 Feb 
1993). Such markets are 
certainly often irrational and 
ill-informed, but the likelihood 
that the British government 
will default on its debts in the 
foreseeable future is, for 
practical purposes, zero. As 
the radically different cases 
of the United States and 
Venezuela illustrate, default 
is more likely to arise as a 
result of political dysfunction 
than an assessment of the 
underlying position in terms 
of national assets and 
liabilities, the matters which 
are in the minds of the rating 
agencies. 
The second preliminary issue 
is that parts of the hybrid 
sector today suffer from one 
of the central problems which 
reduced the effectiveness of 
British nationalised 
industries. Civil servants, and 
many of their political 
masters, seek to avoid 
responsibility for outcomes in 
an activity while being 
reluctant to relinquish control 
of that activity. Perhaps the 
most acute manifestation of 
this is in energy, where a 
laudable but perhaps 
unrealistic desire to create a 
competitive energy market 
conflicts with strong, and not 
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necessarily consistent, views 
about what the outcomes of 
that market should be. Rail 
franchising raises similar 
issues. Perhaps evolution of 
mechanisms of greater 
autonomy in schools and 
hospitals is still at too early a 
stage for this criticism to be 
fairly levelled, but the tension 
between power without 
responsibility and its 
corollary of responsibility 
without power is already 
evident. 
Futures 
The range of functions 
undertaken by hybrids is 
diverse and it is reasonable 
to conclude that there is no 
‘one size fits all’ structure. 
But the degree of 
idiosyncrasy and diversity 
described confirms that there 
has been no attempt to draw 
general lessons of 
experience, far less 
developed criteria of good 
practice. 
In the public limited 
company, the board has 
oversight of both the 
activities of the organisation 
and the effectiveness of its 
executive management. It is 
difficult to conclude that this 
function is universally 
performed well anywhere: at 
Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Carillion superficially 
impressive boards proved 
ineffectual in holding 
executive management to 
account. 
Any review of the 
composition of hybrid boards 
reveals that their composition 
is unimpressive by the 
standards of boards of major 
public companies. Hybrid 
boards should not be 
captured by interest groups, 
while nevertheless the 
objectives of the organisation 
must reflect the reasonable 
expectations of different 
stakeholder groups; this 
outcome will generally be 
better achieved by honest 
brokers than through the 
conflicting assertive voices of 
delegates advocating the 
importance of the interests 
they represent. While there is 
importance to achieving 
diversity of gender, ethnicity, 
etc. it is difficult to avoid the 
impression the board 
composition of hybrids is 
currently constructed with 
greater reference to 
genuflecting to the needs of 
varied constituencies than in 
achieving effectiveness of 
supervisory function. 
However in the absence of 
an effective board, it is not 
possible to achieve either 
proper accountability for 
executive management or 
secure balance between the 
social and financial 
objectives of hybrids. 
That balance is key to their 
performance. Just as the 
different needs of different 
stakeholders are not well 
resolved by representatives 
competing for their 
respective interests, the 
relative importance of 
financial and social 
objectives of hybrids are 
better matched against each 
other by a single body than 
subject to conflict between 
different bodies proclaiming 
the supremacy of either the 
social or the financial. 
Perhaps the central difficulty 
of managing services in 
health and education is to 
persuade practitioners to 
assume responsibility for 
using available resources to 
achieve the best possible 
health and educational 
outcomes, rather than simply 
to act as advocates the 
needs of patients of students 
and demand, insatiably and 
unsuccessfully, that 
whatever resources they 
believe to be necessary are 
made available. 
One would need to have 
extreme, and unjustifiable, 
faith in the role of a board 
populated by high custodians 
of the public interest to 
believe that hybrids could be 
left free of broader regulatory 
oversight. Such oversight 
may be undertaken by a 
regulatory agency such as 
OFWAT or OFGEM or, as 
seems more appropriate for 
agencies such as 
Companies House and the 
Land Registry, directly by the 
responsible government 
department. As with the 
boards of hybrids, there is no 
merit and significant 
disadvantage in separating 
the regulation of finance from 
the regulation of social 
functions.  
UKGI is staffed principally by 
people with experience in 
corporate finance and 
investment banking. This is 
plainly useful when the 
government’s objective is to 
sell shares in the hybrid. 
However only in a small 
number even of the hybrids 
in which UKGI is involved is 
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this appropriate. Shares in, 
for example, Companies 
House would simply 
represent a stake in future 
revenues from Companies 
House, necessarily 
controlled by government – 
effectively a convoluted form 
of government borrowing. 
While the sale of securities 
would facilitate the 
application of a Companies 
Act structure, principally in 
relation to membership of the 
board, that in turn raises the 
question of who the 
members of such a company 
would be. This question does 
not appear to have a 
satisfactory answer in the 
case, for example, of 
privatised water companies 
which have complex 
ownership structures based 
on elaborate financial 
engineering. Whatever the 
right answer to the question 
of who should be the ultimate 
controlling party in the 
provision of important public 
services in the UK, the 
answer cannot possibly be ‘a 
company located in a tax and 
regulatory haven with 
unknown beneficial owners’. 
 
 
References 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (2016). A review of the governance and 
regulation of the BBC. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/504003/PDF_FINAL_20160224_AM_Clementi_Review.pdf  
Davies, G. (2004). The BBC and public value. Social Market Foundation. 
http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2004/12/Publication-The-BBC-and-Public-Value.pdf   
Morrison, H. (1933). Socialisation and transport: The organisation of socialised industries with 
particular reference to the London Passenger Transport Bill. 
Myners, P. (2014). The Co-operative Group: Report of the Independent Governance Review. 
https://www.co-operative.coop/investors/myners-report   
Weber, M. (2015). Politics as vocation, in Waters, T. and Waters, D. (eds. and trans.) Weber’s 
Rationalism and Modern Society, pp. 127-231 
Wessel, D., and Vogel Jr., T. T. (1993). Arcane world of bonds is guide and beacon to a 
populist president, Wall Street Journal, 25 February. 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © John Kay, 2018 Welsh Economic Review, 26, 2018 
